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This study investigates how salary rigidities affect teacher quality across teaching subjects
and high schools and whether high quality teachers can be compensated sufﬁciently to attract
them into unfavorable schools. For identiﬁcation, we rely on idiosyncratic variations in
compensation across adjacent districts within the same state. The results indicate that, on
average, math/science teachers’ scholastic aptitudes are 8.5 percentiles lower and humanities
teachers are 4.5 percentiles lower compared to other teachers. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that schools
with higher percentages of student eligible for free lunch hire teachers with, on average, 7 to 17
percentiles lower scholastic aptitudes with the math/science teachers being even lower. Increases
in lifetime compensation is found to raise the scholastic aptitude of teachers hired across all
schools, with diminishing returns in schools with more favorable working conditions. However,
the lower 26% of the teacher aptitude distribution seems to not respond to compensation
at all with only marginal gains up to the 60th percentile. Furthermore, bonus/merit pay or
additional school activity income do not seem to be signiﬁcant in recruiting/retaining high
aptitude teachers.
KEYWORDS: Salary Schedules, Incentive-based Pay, Math and Science Teachers, Wage
Gradient, Teacher Sorting, Teacher Quality
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59717, Phone: (406) 994-5628.1. Introduction
An increased emphasis on teachers has been seen in the education reform debate following the
passing of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 and the Race to the Top Fund, with particular
concern over the quality of math and science instruction. Hiring qualiﬁed math and science
teachers can be particularly difﬁcult due to salary schedules equalizing pay across teaching
subjects and teacher quality.1 This wage rigidity causes individuals to sort into teaching and
non-teaching occupations as well as teachers to sort across school districts with higher quality
teachers sorting into schools with more favorable work environments.2 What makes math and
science teachers different from other teachers is that those who obtain a major in math or a
science in college can potentially earn substantially higher wages in the non-education labor
market, i.e., the wage elasticity of math/science teachers is potentially very different than that of
other teachers.
The teacher sorting literature has shown that when compensation is rigid, teachers sort
based on school/district characteristics.3 Teachers with more experience and degrees from
more competitive colleges sort into counties with higher per capita income as well as by the
percent of non-white students (see Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994) and Lankford, Loeb, and
Wyckoff (2002)). These results have been conﬁrmed by Jackson (2009) using post desegregation
data who ﬁnds that schools that experienced a repatriation of black students experienced a
signiﬁcant decrease in teacher experience, level of teachers’ degrees, and competitiveness of
1A salary schedule is a pay grade matrix that dictates teachers’ salaries by years of experience and educational
attainment. The schedule may also provide salary reductions due to probationary statuses or any additional pay to
certain types of teachers, i.e., compensation to retain teacher in areas of shortage. The schedule may be self-imposed
by schools or may be the result of bargaining between teachers’ unions and school boards.
2In recent news, an Ohio mother was convicted of falsifying her residency records to enroll her child in a
neighboring school district. Copley-Fairlawn School District indicated that she was cheating because her daughter
received a quality education without paying taxes to fund it (see Canning and Tanglao (2011)).
3Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson (2004) using Missouri data shows that math and science teachers, higher
scholastic aptitude teachers, and those who attended higher quality undergraduate institutions do not receive
signiﬁcantly different wage offers than their colleagues with lesser credentials.
1teachers’ college.4 Bonesrønning, Falch, and Strøm (2005) also ﬁnds that when wages are
rigidly structured, teachers sort themselves into schools by workload in Norway. Studying the
labor supply of teachers, Engel and Jacob (2011) shows that the demographic characteristics
of schools have signiﬁcant effects on the number of applicants per vacancy, with the expected
direction. Interestingly, even the size of district can have an effect on teacher sorting. Heutel
(2009)usingatournamentmodeldemonstratesthathigherqualityteacherswillacceptequivalent
pay to low qualityteachers if they have higher probabilitiesof obtaining administrative positions.
Research has also found that teachers sort across school types with teachers with better academic
credentials sorting into private and charter schools rather than traditional public schools (see
Podgursky (2008)).
To date, little empirical research has been conducted to determine how big ﬁnancial
incentives need to be to attract and retain teachers in hard-to-staff schools. Three notable papers
have studied the effect of compensating differentials for higher quality teachers to remain in
unfavorable schools. Levinson (1988) ﬁnds that teachers demand higher wages to teach less
wealthy, lower-achieving students and that since wealthier schools demand and pay for better
teachers, the expected wage beneﬁt is reverse. Studying teacher transfers out of Milwaukee,
Imazeki (2005) ﬁnds that it would take substantial increases in pay to retain teachers in this
unfavorable area. Given that these teachers make the joint decision of where to live and
work, this effect may overstate the amount an unfavorable urban school must pay to obtain
higher quality teachers. Clotfelter et al. (2008) using data from North Carolina ﬁnds that bonus
payments of $1,800 to certiﬁed math, science, and special education teachers working in high-
poverty or low test score schools reduced teacher turnover by 17% with experienced teachers
being the most responsive. It is not certain that it is the recognition in the workplace or the
4Similar results are found in Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007)
2compensation that reduced attrition. In any event, this result is somewhat unique as a small
change in lifetime compensation produces a substantial reduction in attrition.
Teacher sorting would be of little concern if teacher quality had no effect on student
achievement. In recent years there has been an abundance of papers that demonstrate that
teachers matter. Ferguson (1991, 1996) ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive effects of teacher test scores
on student test scores in Texas and Alabama schools respectively. Similarly, Strauss and Sawyer
(1986) ﬁnd that a 1% increase in the standardized test scores of teachers increases the pass rates
of North Carolina high school students by 5% on math and reading proﬁciency tests. Ehrenberg
and Brewer (1994), using national data, ﬁnd that the quality of a teacher’s undergraduate
institution is highly related with student test outcomes and that a one category increase in the
selectivity of a teacher’s institution is associated with a 1-2% increase in student test scores.5
Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) examine 9th-grade math teachers in Chicago Public
Schools and ﬁnd an effect between observable teacher characteristics and student outcomes,
with one of the strongest effects coming from a teacher’s undergraduate major. Math and
science majors were found to have a positive effect on math scores while education majors
had a negative effect. Monk (1994) examines the impact of subject knowledge, such as a major
or minor in the subject taught, and ﬁnds signiﬁcant gains in student learning for U.S. high school
students. Monk further ﬁnds these subject knowledge gains to be particularly strong in math and
science subjects. Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007) make use of detailed data on 3rd - 5th grade
students in North Carolina public schools and ﬁnd that the effect of improved teacher credentials
is especially strong in math achievement. It appears that the effect is non-linear with bigger
effects found at either end of the teacher quality distribution. Goldhaber and Anthony (2007)
also make use of North Carolina data to examine the effects of the National Board Certiﬁcation
5Further examples include Hanushek (2010), Rockoff (2004), Loeb and Page (2000), Summers and Wolfe
(1977), and Winkler (1975) who ﬁnd similar positive effects on student achievement.
3process and ﬁnd mixed evidence that improved observable teacher credentials such as degree
type and level have positive impact on student achievement. For a general survey of the literature
linking teacher academic ability and student achievement, Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996)
and Hanushek (1981, 1986) provide an excellent summary of previous ﬁndings. These surveys
generally conclude that of all measurable school and teacher characteristics, academic ability of
teachers has the largest effect on student outcomes. As Hanushek (1981) states, “[t]he only
relatively consistent ﬁnding is that ‘smarter’ teachers seem to do better in terms of student
achievement.”
This study examines whether increasing teacher compensation in unfavorable schools can
overcome higher quality teachers’ reluctance to work in them. We focus on math/science and
humanities teachers as quality is imperative to core education production compared to non-
math/science/humanities teachers. The questions this paper attempts to answer are 1) how do
salary schedules affect teacher quality across subjects?, 2) how do salary schedules affect teacher
quality across schools?, and 3) how much and what types of compensation do math/science and
humanities teachers require to sort into less favorable schools? To answer these questions, we
estimate the effect of various compensation and work environment characteristics on general
scholastic aptitude and subject-speciﬁc scholastic scores of teachers hired.6 For identiﬁcation,
we rely on idiosyncratic variations in compensation across adjacent districts within the same
state. This permits us to identify how scholastic aptitudes teachers hired are affected by school
and compensation characteristics. We then study how compensation affects the aptitude of
teachers hired in unfavorable schools. This is done by analyzing the responsiveness to teachers
6We measure general scholastic aptitude as the teachers’ percentiles in the distribution of scholastic aptitude
of all college students and subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude as teachers’ percentiles in the distribution of
scholastic aptitude of college students majoring in her teaching subject. For example, a math teacher’s subject-
speciﬁc scholastic aptitude is measured as her percentile in the math/sciences college majors’ scholastic aptitude
distribution.
4in the fourth quartile in the percent eligible for free lunch, a key indicator used by teachers to
sort across schools, and then determine how much compensation raises scholastic aptitude of
teachers hired in these schools.
The results indicate that math/science and humanities teachers hired have, on average, 2 - 2.5
percentiles higher general scholastic aptitudes. On the other hand, compared to their respective
college peers, math/science teachers have, on average, 8.2 percentiles lower scholastic aptitude
compared to math/science majors and humanities teachers have, on average, 4.5 percentiles
lower scholastic aptitude compared to humanities majors. These correspond to a half standard
deviation and a quarter standard deviation decline in scholastic aptitude, respectively. This
decline can be attributed to the use of salary schedules equalizing pay across teaching subjects.
Consistent with the literature, aptitude and teacher experience are inversely related. The
estimation results also suggest that controlling for student characteristics, a 1.25% increase
in lifetime compensation can mitigate the decline in subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude of
math/science teachers and a little less than a 1% increase for humanities teachers. However,
the quantile regression estimates indicate that only the upper 75% of the aptitude distribution for
math/science teachers respond to increases in compensation. This implies that across the board
increases in compensation will, in the long-run, increase teacher quality but at a substantial
cost of paying 25% of teachers more without any change in quality hired. The results clearly
show that teachers sort primarily on the percent of students in their school eligible for free
lunch and little evidence for the percent of non-white students. For these unfavorable schools,
we ﬁnd larger attrition rates of higher scholastic aptitude teachers than favorable schools for
math/science teachers and humanities teachers. Furthermore, the effect of compensation on the
scholastic aptitude of teachers hired is almost twice as large for math/science and humanities
teachers. However, teachers below the bottom 50th percentile in aptitude seem to not respond at
5all to pay increases.
The results of this paper extend the literature in multiple dimensions. First, this paper
documents how salary schedules affect the scholastic aptitude of math and science teachers.
Given that math and science teachers generally have higher scholastic aptitudes, this paper
shows that it is not general scholastic aptitude that declines due to salary rigidities but rather
subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude, i.e., the scholastic aptitude of teachers relative to their
respective subject matter college peers. Second, this paper quantiﬁes the relative importance
of compensation versus school characteristics for sorting math/science teachers as well as for
humanities teachers across the entire scholastic aptitude distribution, identifying non-linear
effects of compensation and school characteristics. Lastly, the paper provides clear policy
implications on whether compensating differentials can entice higher aptitude teachers to sort
into less favorable schools.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model that frames the
effect of the wage rigidity on the equilibrium quality of teachers hired at a particular school.
Section 3 provides information on the data construction and summary statistics, while section
4 provides the empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the main empirical results and section 6
concludes.
2. The Theoretical Framework
In order to provide an empirical framework in which to examine the impact of contract rigidities,
we provide a theoretical model for the teacher stafﬁng decision. The basic structure utilized here
is similar to that of Gilpin and Kaganovich (2009). The objective of a school is to produce
the highest per student education quality possible given the available budget.7 For simplicity,
7While the unit of analysis is the school level, little is lost by assuming a district-level analysis.
6we assume that schools combine teacher inputs to educate students in two broad categories:
math/science and humanities subjects and abstract from differences in the size of the student








where wk(wk) are the market wage rates exogenously given to the school for aptitude wk while
nk(wk) is the quantity of individuals hired with aptitude wk for k = s;h. The index, k, simply
indicates the subject being taught where s is for the math/science subjects and h is for humanities
subjects. This is important to keep in mind as we assume that teachers are hired by teaching
subject and not necessarily by degree type. The ability distributions of individuals, Ws and Wh,
are taken as given along with the total budget, B. The third term on the right-hand side, T, is the
cost of non-math/science/humanities teachers and non-teaching inputs in education production.
The objective function of high schools is to maximize per student education quality according
to:
E = f(D;As;Qs;Ah;Qh) (2)
where D is all other educational inputs not related to math/science/humanities teachers, Ak =
R
Wk g(a(wk)nk(wk)), is deﬁned as the aggregate quality and Qk =
R
Wk l(nk(wk)), is the aggregate
quantity of teachers with aggregation functions g() and l(). Education quality is increasing but
diminishing in all inputs. Given (1) and (2), high school administrators’ maximization problem
can be constructed. The administrators choose the quantity of math/science and humanities
teachers at each level of ability, ns(ws) 8ws 2 Ws and nh(wh) 8wh 2 Wh and the amount of non-
7teaching input, D, to maximize







Abstracting from the decision to allocate funds between the non-teaching inputs and teaching
inputs, the school maximizes education quality by adjusting the resources expended on teachers
in both subject areas. The teacher inputs can be increased either by hiring more teachers in a
given subject or by hiring higher quality teachers. Thus, for a given budget, schools choose the
quantity and quality of teachers in each subject area.
In addition to the school’s hiring decisions, we also model individuals’ employment choice.
Individuals with ability fws;whg face a decision whether to teach or work outside of teaching
and, if they choose to teach, which subject and school. Thus, potential teachers face the
following problem
maxfUj(wj;lj;vj) 8j 2 J;U0g (4)
where Uj is the indirect utility of a teacher offered a job at school j and J is the set of all offers.
The indirect utility received from each teaching job offer is a function of the wage wj, workload
lj, and environment vj they would face at that school. U0 is the indirect utility they would receive
from working outside of teaching.
Given the framework outlined above, the market for teachers is characterized by a complex
set of decisions by school administrators and individuals. However, the model does allow some
predictions about the effect of imposing a uniform salary structure across subjects as well as
across schools. To obtain these predictions, we make a few simplifying assumptions about the
structure of the education quality function. The ﬁrst is that schools maximize an education
quality objective that requires both math/science and humanities teachers, e.g., the graduation
8rate or college attendance rate. Since both are required for education production, both are
restricted to being essential and somewhat non-substitutable, i.e., the return on math/science and
humanities teachers (quantity and quality) are both bounded to be greater than 0. The second
assumption is that the quantity-quality production trade-off for both subjects are equal. This
variable is parameterized as r. The last assumption is that school administrators buy bundles of
similar quality teacher for a given subject, i.e., they choose one type of quality per subject when














where eAj;wj is the elasticity of wages with respect to aptitude in subject j and r is the elasticity
of substitution between quantity and quality of teachers. Thus, depending on the relative size of
the wage elasticities of quality across subjects, the quality purchased between subjects may be
equal to or greater than the other.8 Assuming that eAs;ws > eAh;wh, eq. (5) is the optimal quantity
and quality of teachers. When r is 1, quantity and quality of teachers are perfectly substitutable
and the optimal quantity and quality of teachers is dictated by the differences in the elasticity
of wages with respect to aptitude across subjects. When r is  ¥, the quantity and quality of
teachers are complementary and require ﬁxed proportions in both the quantity and quality of
teachers to improve education quality. In what follows, we restrict r to be positive and strictly
less than 1.
We can now analyze the optimal quality of teachers under rigid wages across teaching
subjects. First, assuming that the school work condition policy (dictated by a collective
8While earnings tend to be larger for higher aptitude math/science individuals than humanities individuals in
the non-education workforce, this may not be true for the individuals who have entered the education sector.
Math/science teachers may have fewer wage opportunities outside of teaching than humanities teachers given the
type of individual who decides to teach in math/science versus the type of individual who decides to teach in the
humanities.
9bargaining contract or a self-impose mandate) equalizes class sizes across subjects, i.e., the left-
hand side of (5) is 1, then the optimal quality of math/science teachers is less than the optimal
quality of non-math/science teachers.9 Second, assuming that the school has a salary schedule
(dictated by a collective bargaining contract or self-imposed policy), then the optimal solution
is to increase the quantity of math/science teachers more than in the case with no wage rigidity
and hire math/science teachers of relatively lower quality. Third, assuming that the school has
a salary schedule and a class size policy, then the optimal solution for the school is to hire
math/science teachers of relatively lower quality than in the case with no contract rigidities.
We can now place this single school’s problem within an array of schools that compete in
the teacher labor market. There are two scenarios that are worthwhile to discuss. If schools
are given a ﬁxed budget identical to all other schools by state mandate, then teachers will
sort by their preferences across schools with more preferred schools hiring the highest quality
teachers. When schools have budgets dictated by local taxes, teacher compensation is adjusted
across communities until teacher quality reﬂects the demand by families in their respective
communities. Under this scenario, higher quality teachers will be observed in communities that
demand higher quality teachers. In reality, most schools are in communities that lie somewhere
between these two extremes with some of the funding coming from local revenues and the
remaining coming from state revenues. Given that teacher compensation is funded from state
or even federal funds, an analysis ‘on the margin’ of teacher quality can be conducted by
comparing the hiring outcomes of various schools with similar working conditions who differ in
compensation.
9Giventhatclasssizeisperfectlyobservable, theenforcementof‘EqualPayforEqualWork’typicallyconstrains
workloads to be equal across subjects. Furthermore, initial regressions using class size and other workload
characteristics indicate there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between math/science and humanities teachers’
workloads.
103. Data
The primary data for this study comes from the 1999-2000, 2003-04, and 2007-08 restricted-
access version of the Schools and Stafﬁng Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for
Education Statistics. This survey incorporates questionnaires from roughly 50,000 teachers in
10,000 public schools every four years. The SASS data contain exact wage and beneﬁt data
along with several school/district characteristics.
Teacher quality is measured as a teacher’s general schlastic aptitude and subject-speciﬁc
scholastic aptitude. We measure general scholastic aptitude as the teachers’ percentiles in the
distribution of scholastic aptitude of all college students and subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude
as teachers’ percentiles in the distribution of scholastic aptitude of college students majoring
in her teaching subject. For example, a math teacher’s subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude is
measured as her percentile in the math/sciences college majors’ scholastic aptitude distribution.
While we recognize that there are other components of a teacher’s quality that contribute to
the performance of students, previous ﬁndings in the literature such as Greenwald, Hedges,
and Laine (1996), Hanushek (1981, 1986) and Hanushek et al. (2005) suggest that the largest
effect on high school student achievement among measureable teacher quality characteristics is
a teacher’s scholastic ability.
We construct subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitudes of teachers to assure that we are measuring
within-subject scholastic aptitude and not general aptitude. Using subject-speciﬁc scholastic
scores assures that the true effects of subject-speciﬁc aptitude are identiﬁed for each teaching
subject and not the confounded effect of higher general scholastic aptitude teachers switching
teaching subjects. To construct subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitudes, we ﬁrst standardize all
undergraduate college students’ ACT and SAT scores from six rounds (1989-90, 1992-93, 1995-
96, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08) of restricted-access versions of the National Post-Secondary
11Aid Survey (NPSAS).10 We then construct subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude distributions, one
for math/science majors, one for humanities majors, and another for all other majors using
the standardized scores for the college students.11 The subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitudes of
teachers are then constructed by taking the teachers’ scholastic aptitude scores and determining
their corresponding percentiles in their main teaching subject’s distribution (math/sciences,
humanities, or all other).
Since the SASS only provides the majors as well as the undergraduate institutions of the
teachers and not their actual ACT or SAT scores, we impute their scores based on the average
scholastic aptitude of the college students who also majored with them at their institution. As
a measurement of scholastic ability, this imputed value provides better precision than using
either the college selectivity or college ranking such as those found previously in the literature.
By construction, our scholastic measurement has the advantage of not mixing scholastic scores
across majors as there may be signiﬁcant differences in the aptitude of students across majors
within the same university.12 This assumption is somewhat validated by the fact that the sample
variance of scholastic aptitudes is higher across majors within a university than across all
universities within a major.13
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the scholastic aptitudes of college students and
teachers as measured by their percentile in the various scholastic aptitude distributions. All
college students’ aptitude scores are standardized as indicated in the table by the average
aptitude of college students being the 50th percentile. College students majoring in math/science
10Raw scholastic scores and references to converting SAT to ACT scores is found in the appendix on Table A.3.
11A list of majors classiﬁed by subject can be found in the appendix on Table A.1.
12The disadvantage of this approach is that scores are detrended across years to obtain a sufﬁcient sample of
students within each university-major. However, the majority of the literature also does not permit institutional
quality to vary across years.
13For double majors and second degree teachers, we take the arithmetic average of their scholastic aptitudes
across their majors.
12disciplines are, on average, 14 percentiles higher in aptitude than all college students compared
to students majoring in the humanities disciplines who are, on average, 3.2 percentiles higher
aptitude than all college students. Interestingly, education majors are 11.4 percentiles lower
aptitude than the average college student or an entire standard deviation away from math/science
majors. The spread between math/science and humanities teachers is much smaller than the
spread between math/science and humanities college student and the distribution of scholastic
aptitudes for all teaching subjects is tighter than the distributions for college graduates. While
math/science teachers are relatively similar to other teachers in general aptitude, this is not the
casewithrespecttosubject-speciﬁcscholasticaptitude. Placingmath/scienceteachers’aptitudes
into the math/science subject-speciﬁc aptitude distributions, and similarly for all other teachers,
indicates that math/science teachers are, on average, 8 percentiles lower aptitude than other
math/science majors and that humanities teachers are, on average, 2.6 percentiles lower aptitude
than humanities majors. This is mostly driven by the types of colleges teachers select. Special
education teachers and all other teachers have similar aptitudes to typical college students.
The correlation between general aptitude and subject-speciﬁc aptitude for teachers is
provided at the bottom of Table 2 by major. Humanities majors have the highest correlated
measures of aptitude, e.g., a high general aptitude equates to a high subject-speciﬁc aptitude,
while education majors have the lowest correlation between aptitudes. The low correlation
of education majors indicates that relative to humanities or math/science majors, education
majors are of lower aptitude. Given that teachers can teach classes outside of their subject-
area knowledge, e.g., humanities majors can teach math, and the correlations of aptitudes are
not the same across majors, this provides reason for using the subject-speciﬁc aptitude measure
over the general measure.
We also create three measures of compensation from the SASS data. The ﬁrst is lifetime
13teacher income deﬁned as the current value of the expected future ﬂow of income over a forty
year teaching career in her current school. We construct this for those that have a bachelor’s
degree (labeled BA) and for those that have a master’s degree or beyond (labeled MA) using
PIed = startpayed 40+(steped 402)=2 (6)
where ed = fBA;MAg and startpayed is the starting pay of teachers for education attainment
ed with corresponding annual salary increase steps of steped in the teachers’ district.14 The
advantage of this particular measure is that it is exogenous to teachers’ experience. Thus, only
shifts in the salary schedule are identiﬁed and not simply movements along the schedule (see
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1999) for similar analysis). The second measure of compensation
is the reported annual merit/bonus pay teachers receive. This pay is not for additional
responsibilities but rather added on top of the teachers’ regular pay. The third measure of
compensationisannualadditionalactivitiesincome. Thisincludessummerschoolcompensation
as well as compensation for all other extracurricular activities. This may be given to teachers in
an effort to raise their salaries. All three compensation measures are signiﬁcantly right skewed.
After logging the measures, all have shape parameters of being normally distributed.
Table 3 breaks down summary statistics on scholastic aptitude, whether the teacher has a
degree in her teaching subject, and compensation for math/science teachers and humanities
teachers, respectively. This table demonstrates that as the number of student eligible for free
lunch increases, the average scholastic aptitude of teachers hired declines, the probability of
the teacher having a degree in her teaching subject declines, and compensation decreases. The
descriptive statistics do not attribute the decline in teacher quality to lower compensation or
14Given that starting pay and the step are not always positively related, it provides a precise calculation that is
comparable across all districts.
14student characteristics.
Summary statistics for the teacher and school/district level variables are found in Table 4
for math/science and humanities teachers. The summary statistics indicate that 45% of the total
sample are math/science teachers while 55% are humanities teachers. Subsampling the data,
48.9% of math/science teachers are male compared to 40% of humanities teachers.15 It should
be noted that only community level characteristics measuring population density, whether the
school is in the rural or in a metropolitan area, are included. This may appear to be a severe
omission since teachers may use other community characteristics when they are deciding to
accept employment in certain schools. Using factor analysis, we ﬁnd that the community-level
characteristics (community income and percent of adult population with at least a bachelor’s
degree) have high communalities (71.1% and 61.7% respectively) with the school characteristics
(percent of student body eligible for free lunch, percent of student body being a minority,
whether the school is in a metro area, and whether the school is in a rural area) variables.
Furthermore, both had eigenvalues less than one which lends support to excluding them over
the school characteristic variables.
4. Empirical Speciﬁcation
Theempiricalstrategyisbasedonthetheoreticalmodel. Thetheoreticalmodeldemonstratesthat
schools choose the quality of teachers according to the limits of their budget constraint and the
wages that teachers of various scholastic aptitudes are willing to accept for each teaching subject.
For their part, teachers accept an offer based on a combination of wages and non-pecuniary
school characteristics as well as other idiosyncratic reasons. Thus, the observed teacher aptitude
15The categorization of high school classes into math/sciences, humanities, and other classes is found in the
appendix in Table A2.
15of a particular teacher hired is the outcome of the joint decisions of school administrators and
the individual teachers. We estimate a reduce form equation with teachers’ scholastic aptitude
as the dependent variable and the compensation measures, teacher and school characteristics, as





where Ai;j is the observed scholastic aptitude of teacher i hired in school j,Compi is a vector of
teacher compensation measures, Xi represents vectors of teacher characteristics, Xj represents
vectors of school characteristics, ds and dm are state ﬁxed effects and urbanicity dummies,
and ei;j is the error term. Given that teachers are not paid compensating differentials for
unfavorable school characteristics, compensation and school environment characteristics can be
includedtogetherwithoutanyendogeneityissues(seeGilpin(forthcoming)forfurtherdetails).17
Furthermore, given our construction of teacher compensation, teacher experience can also be
included on the right-hand-side as it is uncorrelated with lifetime teacher income. Lastly, we also
include state ﬁxed effects to control for unobservables that may biased the work environment
or compensation coefﬁcients. We do this since districts mostly hire individuals from within
state and scholastic aptitude may be highly correlated with in-state college selectivity. The
results of this analysis will provide the effects of various work environment characteristics
on teacher aptitude controlling for compensation measures. Subsampling the data to only
teachers in the most unfavorable schools, we control for working conditions and then can exploit
16It is through sorting (and in particular recruitment and retention) that teacher quality changes and not simply
through increases in compensation to existing teachers. This implies that the observed teacher quality is a function
of schools’ and teachers’ decision making and that this can be inﬂuenced through changes in school policies and
teachers’ decisions.
17Paying all teachers the same amount in all districts in a particular state is different from providing additional
compensation to teachers working in unfavorable schools.
16variation in compensation to understand whether and how much higher quality teachers must be
compensated to work in these schools. We deﬁne the unfavorable schools as those having an
effect of teachers’ decision to sort away from them.
We further investigate the effects through quantile regression. To do this, the analysis
groups teachers based on their subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitudes and then determines whether
groups of different aptitude teachers respond differently to compensation and work environment
characteristics. We do this since the effect of compensation and school characteristics may be
non-linear, e.g., low aptitude teachers may respond differently to working conditions than high





where the variables are as described in eq. (7) with the addition of t representing a given
percentile of scholastic aptitude.18
5. Empirical Results
Prior to estimating the model, we investigate the magnitude of the intraclass correlation of
having teacher observations within the same school, if intraclass correlation is high, i.e., many
teachers in a given school are quite similar, then the effect of lifetime teacher compensation is
not identiﬁed. To investigate the intraclass correlation, we ﬁrst investigate how many teachers
are within each school and then test the intraclass correlation statistics similar to an analysis of
variance for the dependent variables. 50% of all schools has two or less teachers in the sample
while almost 80% of the sample has four or less teachers. Given that we investigate math/science
18Ma and Koenker (2006) provide an in-depth analysis and comparison of various methods to estimating quantile
regressions.
17teachers and humanities teachers separately, this implies that roughly 80% of the sample will
have two or less teachers for each school-subject level. Further evidence of small intraclass
correlation is provided through the statistically signiﬁcant intraclass correlation statistic of .12
for teachers’ aptitude. Having low intraclass correlation for quality teachers demonstrates that
clustering is minimal.
To investigate how clustering impacts the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimates, we run
each equation separately with homoscedastic, heteroscedastic robust, and cluster robust standard
errors at the school level. The statistical signiﬁcance of the standard errors remains the same
across these three estimations even though the cluster robust standard errors are higher than the
standard and robust standard errors as expected. Another robustness check is to remove the state
ﬁxed effects to see how large an issue unobservable effects are. As reported in Tables 5 and 6,
unobservables effects are quite minimal for math/science and humanities teachers, our primary
groups of interest. While not reported, the coefﬁcient estimates for non-math/science/humanities
teachers without state ﬁxed effects shows large differences in magnitude and signiﬁcance.
5.1. Estimation Results on General Scholastic Aptitude
The coefﬁcient estimates using the general measure of scholastic aptitude are presented in
Table 5 with cluster-robust standard errors. The results of these regressions indicate that both
math/science and humanities teachers have signiﬁcantly higher general scholastic aptitudes
of approximately 2 - 2.5 percentiles while special education teachers have 1.7 percentiles
lower aptitude. Teachers hired with advanced degrees have about 1.5 - 2 percentiles higher
aptitude and the aptitude of teachers is inversely related to teacher experience. Higher aptitude
math/science/humanities teachers tend to exit teaching at almost twice the rate as high quality
non-math/science/humanities teachers. In terms of teacher sorting, the results indicate that the
18percent of students eligible for free lunch has a signiﬁcant effect of the scholastic aptitude of
teachers hired, but not the percent of minority students regardless if state ﬁxed effects are present
or not. The magnitude is statistically similar between math/science and humanities teachers with
a .5 percentile decline per 10 percent increase in students eligible for free lunch. Relative to
other inﬂuences, this effect could be quite considerable going from the bottom quartile to the
top quartile in percent of students eligible. Other school characteristics that had an effect are
whether a union was present, lowering aptitude by approximately 1 percentile while the size
of the district, as measured as the number of schools within a district, increases the aptitude
of teachers hired. There are a variety of reasons that can explain this. Some examples include
larger districts may increase the probability of being promoted to an administrative position for
higher aptitude individuals compared to smaller districts or that there are clearer benchmarks
for teachers in larger districts. Lastly, compensation seems to matter for teacher sorting with
higher paying schools able to hire higher quality teachers. For every 1% increase in lifetime
teacher compensation, math/science teachers and humanities teachers’ aptitudes increase by
approximately 7 to 7.5 percentiles while a 1% increase in bonus/merit pay increases teacher
quality by .2 percentiles. As discussed above, estimates without state ﬁxed effect varied little
from those with state ﬁxed effects included. Furthermore, including state ﬁxed effects increases
the effect of compensation on the aptitude of teachers hired. Thus, not including state ﬁxed
effects downward biases the effect of compensation.
5.2. Estimation Results on Subject-speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude
Table 6 presents the results of the subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude estimated using ﬁxed
effects, urbanicity dummies, and cluster robust standard errors at the school level. We
ﬁrst estimate the effects jointly for all teachers for a baseline, and then estimate the
19same regression for math/science/humanities teachers, math/science teachers, and humanities
teachers, respectively. This, in essence, unconstrains the control variables in each successive
regression. After running each subsequent regression, we perform F-tests to see if the non-
compensation coefﬁcients across regressions are equal and these tests are rejected for all non-
compensation variables. We also test if the compensation coefﬁcients are equal as well. Tests
on the coefﬁcient of permanent income and bonus pay reject that all teachers and math/science
teachers respond the same as well math/science teachers and humanities teachers. Testing that
the coefﬁcients on the compensation measures for math/science and humanities teachers fails
to reject that they are identical. Thus, using average effects, math/science teachers respond
similarly to compensation but not for working conditions.
The
resultsindicatethatthedifferencesinscholasticaptitudesbetweennon-math/science/humanities
teachers and math/science teacher and humanities teachers, respectively, remain after controlling
for compensation and school characteristics and other controls. This implies that the 8.5
percentile difference in scholastic scores of math/science teachers and the 4.5 difference for
humanities teachers are most likely due to salary schedules equalizing pay across all teaching
subjects. In terms of school sorting, the results indicate that the percent of the student body
eligible for free lunch and the number of schools in the district determine how teachers sort.
Furthermore, it seems that non-math/science/humanities teachers sort away from schools with
relatively more minority students.19 The effect of free lunch is, on average, twice as large as
the effect of having a large number of minority students. The estimation also indicates that the
school being located in a metro area increases the scholastic aptitude of teachers hired. This is
of little surprise as higher aptitude individuals are generally attracted to metropolitan areas for
19Robustness checks using the number of school squared and experience square in the same regression were both
insigniﬁcant.
20culturally enriching activities and teachers may not need to work in the communities where their
employment is located (see Ballou (1996) for similar results). The presence of a union has no
effect on teacher sorting for all teachers.
The compensation variables reveal that all three measures of compensation have an effect on
the subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude of teachers hired. The effect of lifetime teacher income
has consistently signiﬁcant effects on math/science and humanities teachers with the scholastic
aptitude of humanities teachers being effect greater than math/science teachers. Controlling
for school characteristics, a 1% increase in compensation raising aptitude by 5 percentiles for
math/science teachers and approximately 8 percentiles for humanities teachers. This implies that
the wage elasticity of teacher quality is quite different across teaching subjects with humanities
teachers being more elastic than math/science teachers. Schools that provide merit/bonus
pay can attract higher subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude teachers as well. As will be shown
in the results of the quantile regressions, merit/bonus pay is not effective as these results
indicate. Lastly, additional school compensation seems to have a negative effect on aptitude
of math/science teachers hired. This may indicate that school administrators are willing to hire
an individual of lesser subject aptitude if they will lead extracurricular activities.
The statistically negative coefﬁcient on teacher experience indicates that the attrition rate
of higher subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude teachers is larger than their less able peers. The
attrition rate of higher subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude teachers is larger for math/science
than humanities teachers. These results on teacher attrition are complementary to the existing
literature on teacher attrition.
5.3. Quantile Estimation Results on Subject-speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude
Using a quantile regression framework, we are able to understand the effect of various covariates
21for teachers sorted by scholastic aptitude. We provide the coefﬁcient estimates from these
regressions for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles in Table 7 and graph the coefﬁcients for
quantile regressions every .025 percentiles for select variables on Figure 1 by teaching subject.
These results indicate that compensating differentials for higher teacher quality may do little
to aid in increasing subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude of lower aptitude teachers hired. For
math/science teachers, increasing lifetime income is not statistically signiﬁcant until the 28th
percentile and a 1% increase in lifetime income raises scholastic aptitudes of teachers by around
5 - 6 percentiles across the remaining distribution (See Figure 1 for more details). On the other
hand, humanities teachers are more responsive to increases in compensation with increases
in lifetime income of the lowest scholastic aptitude teachers by 5 percentiles until the 50th
percentile in which it increases to approximately 8 - 9 percentiles. A F-test for each percentile
rejects that the effect of lifetime compensation are equal between math/science and humanities.
This is a key ﬁnding which highlights the difﬁculty of attempting to raise teacher quality by
increasing compensation, that the majority of the math/science distribution is unresponsive or
mildly responds. This ﬁnding should not be taken that the scholastic aptitude of teachers cannot
be raised, but rather it will increase if compensation is increased substantially.
Observing the effect of teaching experience over the scholastic aptitude distribution indicates
that the higher scholastic aptitude math/science teachers are more likely to leave. The exact
opposite result is found for humanities teachers, i.e., the lowest aptitude humanities teachers are
more likely to depart than the highest aptitude humanities teachers. Lastly, the effect of having a
larger proportion of students eligible for free lunch is quite different between math/science and
humanities teachers across the aptitude distribution. Lower aptitude humanities teachers tend
to discount poor students more so than high aptitude humanities teachers. This may be due to
organizations such as Teach For America and other alternative certiﬁcation paths that get high
22aptitude teachers into unfavorable schools.
5.4. Estimation Results on Subject-speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude for Unfavorable Schools
Giventhatteacherssortbyschoolcharacteristics, westudyifthegeneralresultsoncompensation
holdforschoolwithhighpercentagesofstudentseligibleforfreelunch, thekeysortingindicator.
To do this, we ﬁrst re-run the regressions for select teachers in the top quartile of the school
lunch variable and test if sorting still occurs. If sorting does not occur, then we can test to
see whether higher compensation leads to higher teacher quality among these teachers. One
concern is that state ﬁxed effects rely on within-state variation, which subsampling the data may
eliminate. Indeed, the intraclass correlation on the subsample data for lifetime compensation is
.66 and, on average, 50 percent of all teachers within a state are found in 7 districts. This implies
that state ﬁxed effects and the compensation effects cannot be jointly estimated. Given that
omitted variable bias is quite minimal in the full sample for math/science/humanities teachers
and that excluding state ﬁxed effects downward bias the compensation coefﬁcient, the exclusion
is tolerable.
For the teachers in the top quartile of schools with student eligible for free lunch, we ﬁnd
that school characteristics do not affect the quality of teachers hired, indicating that little sorting
takes place among this subset of schools (See Table 8). The results also suggest that schools that
can increase compensation are able to raise teachers’ subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude. For
everyone 1% increase in lifetime compensation, teacher aptitude increases by 6 percentiles for
math/science teachers and 11 percentiles for humanities teachers. Thus, compensation seems
to have an even higher rate of return in these schools. Merit/bonus pay as well as additional
activities pay do not signiﬁcantly increase the aptitude of math/science teachers hired and
bonus/merit pay has a small impact for humanities teachers. Similar to the baseline results,
23higher aptitude teachers tend to leave teaching at faster rates, and even more so for these
schools. The quantile regression results in Table 9 and Figure 2 indicate that teachers respond
differently depending on the quality of the teacher hired. Increasing lifetime compensation has
no effect on math/science teachers until the 37th percentile and the 55th percentile for humanities
teachers. Similar to the full sample, the effect on humanities teachers is much larger than that on
math/sciecne teachers.
6. Conclusion and Policy Implication
In this study we examine the effects of compensation on two measures of teacher quality:
general scholastic aptitude and subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude. We ﬁnd strong evidence
that salary schedules reduce the subject-speciﬁc aptitude of math, science, and humanities
teachers and that teachers sort on student characteristics. We further ﬁnd that teacher sorting
is different across teaching subjects with math/science teachers responding more so to school
characteristics than humanities teachers. Furthermore, higher aptitude teachers seem to respond
to lifetime compensation increases indicating that school can gain higher aptitude teachers
through increases in lifetime compensation. Similar to the literature, those that remain in
teaching are of lower scholastic aptitude with math/science teachers being more acutely affected
and even more so in unfavorable schools.
This paper brings to light serious concerns on how to get high quality teachers into
unfavorable schools. Given the quantile regression results, simply increasing pay across the
board will not be effective due to almost 40-60 percent of the scholastic aptitude distribution
being unresponsive or responding mildly. Using compensation increases solely for teachers
with subject-speciﬁc higher aptitudes may very well increase teacher quality. A back-of-the-
24envelope calculation indicates that an increase in permanent income of $19,241 for math/science
teachers and$9,717 for humanitiesteachers to teachin unfavorable schoolsmay equalize teacher
quality across schools. It should be noted though that teachers internalize annual merit/bonus
pay and additional school activities differently and that these are not effective at raising teacher
quality. It may be that teachers view these incomes as non-binding for schools in the long-run
and thus temporary. In any event, if education policy dictates that public schools should be at
least equitable on school inputs, it may very well require teachers in unfavorable schools to be
compensated with higher permanent incomes.
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29Table 1: Scholastic Aptitudes of College Students and High School Teachers
Mean Std. Dev.
General Aptitude
All College Students 50.000 34.134
Humanities Majors 53.294 32.857
Math/Sciences Majors 64.184 27.265
Education Majors 38.661 33.364
All Other Majors 43.594 35.287
All Teachers 49.280 16.251
Humanities Teachers 50.848 16.817
Math/Sciences Teachers 50.371 16.788
Special Education Teachers 46.860 15.453
All Other Teachers 47.825 15.274
Subject-speciﬁc Aptitude
Humanities Majors 50.000 34.134
Math/Sciences Majors 50.000 34.134
All Other Majors 50.000 34.134
Humanities Teachers 46.401 17.782
Math/Sciences Teachers 42.149 18.331
Special Education Teachers 50.494 16.762
All Other Teachers 49.435 17.309
Note: General scholastic aptitude is measured as the percentile in the distribution of all college
students. Subject-speciﬁc scholastic aptitude is measured as the percentile in the respective
subject distribution.Table 2: High School Teachers’ College Degree by Teaching Subjecta
Teaching Subject Majors
Humanities Math/Sciences Education All Other Majors
Humanities 74.8% 2.0% 36.5% 6.7%
Math/Sciences 9.1% 73.0% 31.8% 6.0%
All Other Subjectsb 11.5% 8.4% 55.9% 35.7%
Correlationc .86** .76** .63** .85**
a: Rows do not sum to 100% due to double majors and second degrees.
b: Excludes special education teachers.
c: Correlation between general aptitude and subject-speciﬁc aptitude. ** p < 0:01
Table 3: Summary Statistics by % of Students Eligible for Free Lunch
Humanities Teachers
% Free lunch Subject-speciﬁc Degree in log(Per. Inc.) Annual Cost per Unit
Scholastic Aptitude Subject of Scholastic Aptitude
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Std. Dev. Meana
Top Quartile 42.8 17.99 80.2% 14.48 0.18 1130.67
Third Quartile 46.0 16.61 82.5% 14.46 0.19 1036.47
Second Quartile 49.1 17.03 85.4% 14.50 0.19 1008.09
Bottom Quartile 50.2 17.86 87.3% 14.59 0.21 1082.91
Diff. 1st and 4th Q 7.4 7.1% 0.12 -47.77
Math/Science Teachers
% Free lunch Subject-speciﬁc Degree in log(Per. Inc.) Annual Cost per Unit
Scholastic Aptitude Subject of Scholastic Aptitude
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Std. Dev. Meana
Top Quartile 38.77 18.51 75.9% 14.47 0.19 1240.84
Third Quartile 42.03 17.60 77.9% 14.47 0.18 1139.45
Second Quartile 45.37 17.37 81.8% 14.50 0.18 1092.78
Bottom Quartile 46.61 18.29 84.3% 14.59 0.21 1167.56








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 5: Coefﬁcient Estimates on General Scholastic Aptitude Regressions by Teaching Subject
All Tchrs Non-Math/Sci/Hum Math/Sciences Humanities
log(permanent income) 7.397*** 6.261*** 7.251*** 7.519*** 6.976*** 8.132***
(1.067) (1.462) (1.296) (1.880) (1.172) (1.599)
log(bonus/merit income) 0.212*** 0.241*** 0.268*** 0.178** 0.312*** 0.209***
(0.041) (0.065) (0.075) (0.077) (0.070) (0.070)
log(addl schl. income) -0.016 0.049 0.015 -0.071 0.062 -0.027





special eduction teacher -1.733*** -1.232**
(0.490) (0.511)
advanced degree 1.758*** 1.175*** 1.458*** 1.836*** 2.057*** 2.253***
(0.218) (0.332) (0.422) (0.420) (0.382) (0.380)
experience -0.103*** -0.055*** -0.136*** -0.125*** -0.136*** -0.127***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
% eligible for free lunch -0.041*** -0.036*** -0.077*** -0.045*** -0.078*** -0.044***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
% non-white students -0.010 -0.022** -0.016 -0.002 -0.014 -0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
rural -0.717*** -0.369 -0.245 -0.687 -0.448 -1.102**
(0.275) (0.391) (0.500) (0.469) (0.468) (0.441)
metro 1.007*** 1.365*** 1.978*** 1.288** 1.149** 0.625
(0.335) (0.483) (0.601) (0.578) (0.532) (0.490)
union -0.757*** -0.113 0.186 -0.839* -0.202 -1.285***
(0.238) (0.364) (0.431) (0.438) (0.406) (0.421)
size of district 0.005 0.002 0.013*** 0.010** 0.011*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observationsa 25010 9030 7110 7110 8870 8870
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.159 0.083 0.141 0.066 0.123
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
a: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Regressions include all other variables listed in Table 4.Table 6: Coefﬁcient Estimates on Subject-speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Regressions by Teaching
Subject
All non-Math/Sci/Hum Math/Sciences Humanities
log(permanent income) 5.685*** 3.239** 6.650*** 5.068** 7.635*** 7.913***
(1.112) (1.643) (1.405) (2.030) (1.195) (1.615)
log(bonus/merit income) 0.204*** 0.255*** 0.158** 0.171** 0.261*** 0.174**
(0.045) (0.072) (0.080) (0.082) (0.076) (0.074)
log(addl schl. income) -0.081*** -0.037 -0.048 -0.134** 0.023 -0.065





special eduction teacher -2.471*** -1.715***
(0.536) (0.551)
advanced degree 1.902*** 1.500*** 1.962*** 2.134*** 1.970*** 2.152***
(0.242) (0.381) (0.462) (0.460) (0.408) (0.405)
experience -0.121*** -0.098*** -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.123*** -0.112***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
% eligible for free lunch -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.077*** -0.046*** -0.074*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
% non-white students -0.016** -0.026** -0.033*** -0.013 -0.029*** -0.004
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
rural -0.611** 0.0479 -0.562 -1.298** 0.065 -0.787*
(0.300) (0.442) (0.548) (0.527) (0.504) (0.476)
metro 0.822** 1.010* 1.982*** 1.324** 1.232** 0.402
(0.351) (0.516) (0.635) (0.604) (0.580) (0.536)
union -0.355 0.295 0.933* -0.428 0.431 -0.859*
(0.263) (0.409) (0.477) (0.490) (0.429) (0.448)
size of district 0.005 0.002 0.011*** 0.008* 0.011*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observationsa 24700 8920 6990 6990 8790 8790
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.143 0.074 0.126 0.060 0.116
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
a: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Regressions include all other variables listed in Table 4.Table 7: Coefﬁcient Estimates on Subject-Speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Quantile Regressions
Math/Science Teachers Humanities Teachers
Quantile 25 50 75 25 50 75
Compensation Characteristics
log(permanent income) 2.637 6.769*** 5.831** 4.891*** 8.353*** 9.340***
(1.879) (2.570) (2.875) (1.853) (1.597) (1.943)
log(bonus/merit income) 0.097 0.171* 0.120 0.155** 0.091 0.152
(0.085) (0.103) (0.105) (0.070) (0.072) (0.116)
log(addl schl. income) -0.132** -0.143** -0.173** 0.001 -0.027 -0.037
(0.054) (0.072) (0.080) (0.047) (0.046) (0.066)
advanced degree 1.320*** 1.864*** 2.337*** 1.120*** 1.795*** 2.038***
(0.489) (0.617) (0.614) (0.427) (0.418) (0.623)
experience -0.089*** -0.099*** -0.152*** -0.105*** -0.084*** -0.073***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025)
% eligible for free lunch -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.035*** -0.022
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015)
% non-white students -0.027* -0.013 -0.003 -0.032*** -0.012 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
rural -1.145** -0.886 -1.258* -0.836* -0.165 -1.417**
(0.557) (0.625) (0.726) (0.459) (0.394) (0.654)
metro 0.271 0.555 0.450 1.067** 1.087** -0.838
(0.639) (0.815) (0.828) (0.515) (0.548) (0.634)
union 0.771 -0.661 -1.119* -0.523 -0.473 -1.094*
(0.498) (0.588) (0.671) (0.425) (0.396) (0.641)
size of district 0.003 0.010* 0.019*** -0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6990 6990 6990 8790 8790 8790
Adjusted R2
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
a: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Regressions include all other variables listed in Table 4.Table 8: Coefﬁcient Estimates on Subject-speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Regressions - Teachers
in 4th Quartile of Percent Eligible for Free Lunch Schools
Math/Sci/Hum Teachers Math/Sciences Teachers Humanities Teachers
log(permanent income) 4.258** 6.093* 10.95***
(1.867) (3.377) (2.643)
log(bonus/merit income) 0.187** -0.177 0.281*
(0.089) (0.157) (0.152)




advanced degree 0.932* 1.890** 0.846
(0.501) (0.929) (0.872)
experience -0.137*** -0.174*** -0.160***
(0.024) (0.042) (0.039)
% eligible for free lunch -0.026 -0.013 -0.016
(0.019) (0.031) (0.028)
% non-white students -0.021* -0.011 -0.013
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
rural -0.960 -2.626** -0.035
(0.680) (1.069) (1.011)
metro 0.807 1.651 0.097
(0.840) (1.358) (1.188)
union 0.547 1.235 -0.717
(0.487) (0.899) (0.770)
size of district 0.015*** 0.016** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
State Fixed Effects No No No
Observationsa 6250 1750 2180
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.112 0.085
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
a: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Regressions include all other variables listed in Table 4.Table 9: Coefﬁcient Estimates on Subject-Speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Quantile Regressions -
Teachers in 4th Quartile of Percent Eligible for Free Lunch Schools
Math/Sciences Teachers Humanities Teachers
Quantile 25 50 75 25 50 75
log(permanent income) 0.577 9.422*** 12.40*** 1.930 6.556* 17.75***
(4.395) (3.412) (4.527) (2.599) (3.479) (3.721)
log(bonus/merit income) -0.095 -0.108 -0.301 0.262 0.207 0.248
(0.169) (0.191) (0.235) (0.186) (0.172) (0.235)
log(addl schl. income) -0.049 0.074 0.136 0.002 0.130 -0.043
(0.126) (0.133) (0.169) (0.104) (0.138) (0.149)
advanced degree -0.059 3.220*** 2.612* 0.101 1.513 0.825
(1.084) (1.073) (1.496) (0.920) (1.067) (1.247)
experience -0.088* -0.192*** -0.251*** -0.145*** -0.143*** -0.153***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.066) (0.040) (0.044) (0.052)
% eligible for free lunch -0.0164 -0.001 -0.038 -0.056** -0.046 0.019
(0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.027) (0.033) (0.039)
% non-white students -0.0236 -0.006 0.010 -0.012 0.001 -0.007
(0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021)
rural -1.314 -2.982** -2.859 -1.096 0.959 1.313
(1.042) (1.198) (1.799) (1.058) (1.181) (1.610)
metro 1.619 0.537 1.193 -1.499 0.363 1.020
(1.454) (1.646) (1.885) (1.245) (1.608) (1.561)
union 1.715* 1.874* 0.168 -0.751 -1.196 -0.641
(0.900) (1.046) (1.274) (0.983) (0.992) (1.419)
size of district 0.010* 0.018** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
State Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Observationsa 1750 1750 1750 2180 2180 2180
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
a: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Regressions include all variables list in Table 4.Figure 1: Subject-Speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Quantile CoefﬁcientsFigure 2: Subject-Speciﬁc Scholastic Aptitude Quantile Coefﬁcients - 4th Quartile in
% Elg. for Free LunchTable A1: College Majors by Subject
Humanities Education
Communications or journalism Agricultural Autism
Economics Art Counseling and guidance
English literature or composition Bilingual Curriculum and instruction
French Business Deaf and hard-of-hearing
German Cross-cultural Developmentally delayed
History Early childhood Early childhood special
Humanities Elementary al administration
Latin English/language arts al psychology
Law ESL Industrial arts
Library and information science Foreign languages Learning disabilities
Multi or interdisciplinary studies Health Mentally retarded
Native American studies Home econ Mildly or moderately disabled
Other area or ethnic studies Kindergarten Orthopedically impaired
Other languages Mathematics Other
Other social sciences Music Other special
Philosophy Native American Severely disabled
Political science and government Physical Social studies
Psychology Prekindergarten Special
Public administration or service Reading Speech or language impaired
Religion or theology Religious Trades and industry
Russian Science Traumatically brain injured
Sociology Secondary Visually impaired
Spanish Emotionally disturbed behavior disorders
Math=Sciences All Other Majors
Ag and Natl resources Art, ﬁne and applied All Other Areas
Biology/Life science Drama or theater Architecture
Chemistry Music Business and mgmt
Computer science Visual/performing arts Environmental design
Engineering Family consumer science
Geology/Earth science General studies
Mathematics Health professions













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yTable A3: College ACT Statisticsa
Year Mean Std. Dev. Obsb
1990 20.155 4.995 6320
1993 21.244 4.752 23590
1996 21.422 4.728 17690
2000 21.975 4.703 49930
2004 22.416 4.762 24040
2008 22.727 4.652 41580
a: SAT scores are converted to ACT scores. See Dorans (1999) for conversion details.
b: Rounded to the nearest 10 as per data license restrictions.
Source: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) - Restricted versions